Information Systems Research
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 47-60
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1050.0043
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Bandyopadhyay, S.
Right arrow Articles by Chaturvedi, A. R.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

Competition Among Sellers in Online Exchanges

Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, John M. Barron, Alok R. Chaturvedi

Warrington School of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907

shubho.bandyopadhyay{at}cba.ufl.edu
barron{at}mgmt.purdue.edu
alok{at}mgmt.purdue.edu

With the advent of the Internet, and the minimal information technology requirements of a trading partner to join an exchange, the number of sellers who can qualify and participate in online exchanges is greatly increased. We model the competition between two sellers with different unit costs and production capacities responding to a buyer demand. The resulting mixed-strategy equilibrium shows that one of the sellers has a normal high price with random sales, while the other seller continuously randomizes its prices. It also brings out the inherent advantages that sellers with lower marginal costs or higher capacities have in joining these exchanges, and provides a theoretical basis for understanding the relative advantages of various types of sellers in such exchanges.

Key Words: online exchanges; reverse auctions; pricing power; mixed-strategy equilibria
History: This paper was received on December 20, 2002.


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Information Systems ResearchHome page
T. A. Weber and Z. Zheng
A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals
Information Systems Research, December 1, 2007; 18(4): 414 - 436.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Information Systems ResearchHome page
A. Ghose, T. Mukhopadhyay, and U. Rajan
The Impact of Internet Referral Services on a Supply Chain
Information Systems Research, September 1, 2007; 18(3): 300 - 319.
[Abstract] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2005 by INFORMS.